Rethinking Communication in Monetary Policy: Towards a Strategic leaning for the BCC by KIBADHI, Plante M & PINSHI, Christian P.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Rethinking Communication in Monetary
Policy: Towards a Strategic leaning for
the BCC
KIBADHI, Plante M and PINSHI, Christian P.
May 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101665/
MPRA Paper No. 101665, posted 15 Jul 2020 09:13 UTC
Rethinking Communication in Monetary Policy: Towards a Strategic 
leaning for the BCC 
 
Plante M. Kibadhi1 et Christian P. Pinshi2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The ability of a central bank to influence the economy depends on its ability to manage the 
expectations of the general public and the financial system regarding the future development of 
macroeconomic indicators. The communication strategy (in this time of crisis and uncertainty) 
increases transparency, improves public understanding and support for the monetary policy and 
democratic accountability of the Central Bank of Congo (BCC), serving to convergence towards 
the balance of expectations. This paper agrees that a strategic direction of communication, 
focused on coherent messages, can help break down pessimistic expectations, maintain 
confidence, reduce the cost of the crisis and stabilize the economy. In conclusion, the article 
suggests a dozen recommendations, to be able to strengthen and redirect the BCC’s 
communication strategy and contribute to the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The past twenty years have seen a dramatic increase in the speed, range and volume of 
communications. The rapidity with which new media communication technologies are evolving, 
raises serious questions about the capacity of our current means of information (Buda, 1997). 
Nowadays, no important institution, whether public or private, be it a central bank or a sports club, 
can survive without a press office and / or a communication service (Issing, 2005). Central banks 
are moving towards communication as a strategic instrument and are important for influencing the 
economy and managing the expectations of economic agents regarding their future decisions. In 
the area of monetary policy, communication with the population is no longer a debate but rather 
an obligation. It is increasingly seen as a strategic tool in its own right. Of course, it can never be a 
substitute for quality policies, but if economic measures are not understood and accepted by the 
people they affect, they are more likely to fail or even collapse. This principle also applies to other 
structural and economic policies and even to the financial system. With the proliferation of social 
networks, there have never been so many citizens who give their opinion on the choices of 
macroeconomic policies and measures, and everywhere in the world, they expect decision-makers 
to be more transparent and take their decisions. responsibilities. As a result, pressure is mounting 
for the authorities to better explain their actions to a wider audience and prove that they deserve 
their support. In other words, they must redouble their efforts to make themselves heard, to be 
understood and to build confidence, which is a key element in managing expectations and 
macroeconomic stability (Rice and Stankova, 2019). 
The design of an optimal monetary policy (simultaneity of sustainable economic growth and price 
stability)3 essentially depends on the way in which households, businesses and deposit-taking 
institutions (banking system) form their expectations regarding the future (Mishkin, 2008). This 
consideration of the central role of expectations in macroeconomic results has led to the discovery 
of the problem of temporal inconsistency, which undermines confidence in the event of failure to 
achieve the objective. To inhibit this problem of temporal inconsistency, great transparency is 
required (Szyszko and Próchniak, 2018), combined with legal and real independence from central 
banks. This shows the importance of responsibility and communication. Central banks 
communicate with many different groups of economic actors, we target two of these groups 
essential to the conduct of monetary policy, namely actors of other deposit-taking institutions 
(banks, microfinance institutions, cooperatives, …) On the one hand, and the general public on 
the other. In this context, developing a communication strategy on monetary policy that simply 
clarifies things about macroeconomic stability, in other words that meets the expectations of 
economic operators and the general public can have powerful effects. Ben Bernanke (2013), 
Governor of the Federal Reserve, supports this thesis according to which, public expectations 
regarding future monetary policy actions are important today, because these expectations have 
important effects on financial conditions, which in turn affect output, employment and inflation 
over time. The aim of more intensive communication from a central bank will be to ensure greater 
transparency. This allows central banks to be more accountable to the public, explaining their 
monetary policy and decisions in an understandable way. This strengthens public confidence in its 
ability to fulfill its mission of ensuring price stability. This trust is the most valuable asset of a 
central bank. Communication has become an increasingly important aspect (Blinder and al. 2008) 
in the design and conduct of monetary policy. 
 
3 For more details on the favorability of price stability for sustainable growth, see Ilunga and Pinshi (2018). 
3 
 
Experience has shown that clear, quality communication is a very powerful instrument for central 
banks as it influences expectations and stabilizes prices (Bulíř and al. 2013). The communication 
from the BCC has undergone several developments, in particular with the distribution on the 
internet of the annual report, the publication of the report on monetary policy, the conjuncture 
notes, the publication on the post-meeting statements of the monetary policy committee (CPM), 
press conferences, etc. This development from the point of view of communication of the BCC 
expresses the character and the desire to make transparent the conduct of its monetary policy and 
to strengthen confidence within the general public and deposit-taking institutions, also, it also 
facilitates researchers and students to do their research with as much information as possible. 
Despite this feat of communication progress, the BCC still has a hard time forming a strategic 
communication framework and should run faster than Achilles to reach the turtle. Compared to 
other central banks (Fed, ECB, BOJ, Bank of Canada, etc.), in terms of communication, the BCC 
should make a lot of effort to harmonize and develop a marriage of trust with the public, because 
in an area of Kinshasa, 1 in 1000 people knows the final objective of the BCC. According to 
analytical perceptions, this situation does not promote the effectiveness of monetary policy and 
does not ensure confidence. This lack of communication framework is associated with some 
failures of communication from the BCC (Pinshi, 2020), in particular, the delay accumulated over 
the years on the publication of the annual report, (it should be noted that an annual report which 
is always published with a delay of at least one year mowing analyzes and perceptions in terms of 
responsibility and commitment); an extreme deficit in the series of publications and research works 
available on the site (working paper, bulletin, review of monetary policy and financial stability, etc.); 
the non-adaptation of the site, relative to that of other central banks, such as the Fed, the Bank of 
France, the Bank of Canada and / or the Bank of England etc. ; the lack of statistical databases 
available on the site, long series and / or downloadable in Excel format and all other information 
containing all the reports, statements and speeches of the governors. 
In view of this strategic ineffectiveness of communication, this paper aims to promote the 
importance of communication for the BCC in the definition of its monetary policy and also to 
propose a new strategic angle through communication. The latter could curb inflationary and 
exchange rate expectations that hit the economy, on the one hand, macroeconomic and monetary 
instability, and on the other hand, the crisis of confidence, and finally reduce the cost of the 
COVID-19 uncertainty crisis. 
This article proceeds as follows: we briefly provide a literature review of central bank 
communication in section 2. Section 3 outlines the operational importance of communication. 
Section 4 analyzes the communication strategy and its effect on deposit-taking institutions and the 
general public. Section 5 talks about communication as a crisis mitigation tool. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The effectiveness of monetary policy could be strengthened through a good communication 
strategy. Indeed, Woodford (2005) argues that an effective communication strategy is crucial for 
any central bank to successfully solve the typical problems it faces. With a good strategy, monetary 
policy becomes more predictable and inspires more confidence. For this reason, the more effective 
the central bank uses communication by providing maximum information related to the measures, 
the more effective the impact on the economy. The debate over the communication strategy has 
given rise to a huge new scientific literature on central bank communication. Bernanke and al. 
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(1999) stressed the importance of communication for an effective central bank strategy. Central 
bank communications have undergone a major revolution, Davis and Wynne (2016) analyzed the 
impact of communications for central banks via the post-meeting statement of the Fed's monetary 
policy committee. Their results showed that statements by the Fed following a decision are of direct 
importance in mitigating shocks. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) sought to quantify how central 
banks communicate. They examined the communications through speeches by members of the 
Monetary Policy Committee and post-meeting press conferences. They documented how certain 
features of these communications, such as the extent to which committee members agreed on the 
economic outlook in their speeches or provided similar prospects for monetary policy. 
Several researchers have analyzed the importance of communication in managing expectations and 
the strategic efficiency of central banks (Issing, 2005; Başkaya and al. 2008; Yellen, 2011 etc.). As 
communication is capable of guiding expectations, monetary policy becomes more predictable and, 
therefore, communication becomes an important tool for central banks that affect the economy 
through agents’ expectations (Gürkaynak and al. 2005; Montes and Nicolay, 2014). Jansen and De 
Haan (2007) highlighted a negative relationship between the ECB’s communication on the risks to 
price stability (measured on the basis of the frequency of speeches and the strength of the 
governor’s keyword “vigilance”) and changes in equilibrium inflation in the Euro zone. The work 
of Kahveci and Odabaş (2016) proposed a semantic examination of the monetary policy statements 
of the American Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey in order to observe the change in tone of the statements monetary policy with moves 
towards greater transparency. They examined the monetary policy statements of these three central 
banks in the years before the international financial crisis and compared the specifics of the 
language used before and after the crisis. Their results showed that the optimistic tone of the Fed 
decreased during the period studied while the tone of certainty increased. As for the ECB and the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, there is no significant difference in tone in certainty, 
optimism and realism over time. However, for the statements of the last two years of the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey, there is a significant increase in optimistic tone. Ullrich's study 
(2008) analyzed the informative content of the ECB Governor’s monthly introductory statements 
explaining key rate decisions regarding inflation expectations from money market experts for the 
euro area. Estimates are made to determine the influence of ECB communication on the formation 
of expectations as well as the influence of other macroeconomic variables. The results suggest that 
the indicator developed to measure the informational content of the ECB's rhetoric contributes to 
the explanation of the formation of inflation expectations. In addition, the results indicate that a 
communication showing monetary tightening increases inflation expectations for six months. This 
is due to the content on inflation risk obtained in a press release. 
Shapiro and Wilson (2019) used text-mining techniques to analyze transcripts of FED Monetary 
Policy Committee (FOMC) meetings, minutes of their meetings, and speeches by FOMC members. 
They extracted a measure of sentiment from monetary policy from the group of documents 
reviewed and showed that the negative feelings of the FOMC were inversely related to economic 
growth. Likewise, Luangaram and Sethapramote (2016) also analyzed the relationship between the 
communication of the Bank of Japan and macroeconomic performance in Japan. They extracted 
useful textual indicators from the Bank's monetary policy documents using text-mining techniques. 
They found that the inclusion of central bank communication indicators in their model increased 
the response of production to a change in the policy rate. Omotosho and Tumala (2019) also used 
text mining techniques to analyze the communications strategy of the Central Bank of Nigeria. In 
their study, they use the monetary policy releases published after each meeting of the monetary 
policy committee as an important communication tool and build a corpus based on 87 policy 
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releases with a total of 123,353 words. They then examined the readability, feelings and subjects of 
articles published by researchers and agents of the Central Bank of Nigeria on monetary policy. 
They found that the word and sentence structures of monetary policy releases have become more 
complex, reducing its readability. Regarding feelings of monetary policy, they showed an average 
net score of -10.5%, reflecting the level of political uncertainty faced by the monetary policy 
committee. In addition, the results of their work indicate that the subjects guiding the linguistic 
content of press releases have been influenced by the Bank's objectives as well as by the nature of 
the shocks that hit the economy. 
Filardo and Guinigundo (2008) have explored the nature of communication development in Asia-
Pacific central banks and report the results of their qualitative self-assessment survey of 
communication practices in the region. The investigation revealed a fairly sophisticated set of 
communication strategies in the region. This reflects the increased conscious efforts on the policy 
committee to communicate clearly the relevant information to capture the financial markets, the 
media and the general public. As a result, they found that greater transparency and communication 
not only enabled the financial markets and the public to better anticipate the direction of monetary 
policy, but also made it easier to explain the direction of policy. and its justification, for the 
monetary authorities. They also demonstrated that the move towards greater transparency has 
effectively led to less disagreement over the outlook for inflation. Nevertheless, they thought about 
a broad improvement of the communication strategies of the central banks of the region. They 
concluded that increasing the level of economic literacy of the population as a whole would 
certainly help central banks to communicate better with the public. 
Binette and Tchebotarev (2019) studied the Bank of Canada's communication strategy by 
calculating the readability of the report on monetary policy. Their results showed that published 
monetary policy reports were slightly more complicated to understand for the average Canadian. 
They also showed that important macroeconomic events in Canada were associated with increased 
levels of lexical innovation in policy reporting. Similarly, Coenen and al. (2017) studied the 
readability of ECB monetary policy statements and showed that the Governor’s statements on the 
ECB’s monetary policy have become easier to understand over time. Cieslak and Schrimpf (2018) 
quantified the importance of non-monetary information in communication with the central bank. 
They found that non-monetary information prevailed in around 40% of Fed and ECB political 
decision announcements, and this fraction is even higher for communications that provide context 
for political decisions such as press conferences. They argued that non-monetary information is an 
important part of the reaction of the financial markets during the financial crisis and the beginning 
of the recovery, while monetary shocks have grown in importance since 2013. 
Using a dataset of Google Analytics on ECB website traffic and applying high frequency 
identification, Jung and Kühl (2020) empirically examined the influence of ECB communication 
on public demand for information on monetary policy. They found that the monetary policy shocks 
from the ECB boosted demand for information and that public response varied according to the 
size of the shocks. They found that the demand for information is trending upwards and 
responding positively to economic uncertainty. They also confirmed that ECB press conferences 
play an exceptional role as a central communication event. 
Eusepi and Preston (2010) studied the role of central bank communication in stabilizing agents' 
expectations. It has been found that the Taylor rule is not sufficient in itself to achieve 
macroeconomic stability without an effective communication strategy on monetary policy. In other 
words, Taylor’s principle only succeeds in anchoring expectations of the banking system and the 
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general public when the central bank’s communication strategy involves presenting the precise 
details of monetary policy. Unlike Eusepi and Preston (2010), Amato and Shin (2003), Hellwig 
(2002) and Walsh (2007), show that full transparency on central bank forecasts is not always 
desirable because private agents can overreact to loud public signals and overreacting to more 
specific private information. 
Studies on the analysis of central bank communication in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) are still relatively scarce and meager. Pinshi (2020) analyzed on a factual basis the 
implications of central bank communication for the effectiveness of monetary policy in the DRC 
and the management of expectations. He proposed strengthening communication for the BCC, 
supporting the use of national languages, such as Lingala, in press conferences and speeches, and 
using as much television programming as possible on policy measures for economic stabilization. 
Ultimately, the literature now seems to agree that effective communication with the central bank is 
important in shaping expectations, ensuring macroeconomic stability, improving the predictability 
of future monetary policy decisions and strengthening political dialogue with the public. 
3. Why / What / How to communicate? 
Central banks enjoy substantial autonomy in carrying out their mission, it is democratically 
legitimate for the public to understand the actions of the central bank, especially since in recent 
decades political expectations have been high. The development and new technology of the 
financial system has made the functioning of the transmission mechanisms more difficult and the 
degree of pass-through of the interest rate is very low to regulate the economy. A communication 
strategy could cover this ineffectiveness and anchor trust. 
Central bank communication is defined as the supply of information by the central bank to the 
general public on issues such as monetary policy objectives, monetary policy strategy, economic 
prospects and prospects for future political decisions ( Filardo and Guinigundo, 2008). On this, it 
is important to answer the three questions: Why communicate? / What to communicate? / How 
to communicate? 
Why Communicate? The remarkable growth in the emphasis placed on central bank 
communication in the literature on monetary policy and the practice of central banks has now made 
communication a key and powerful tool. Currently, the ability of central banks to influence the real 
economy depends to a large extent on their competence vis-à-vis the expectations of financial 
institutions, businesses and the general public. A comprehensive set of current and future policies 
for the general public is essential for the effectiveness of monetary policy. In this respect, monetary 
policy is considered to be gradually becoming the art of managing expectations (Al-Mashat and al., 
2018). The reason for communicating for central banks is motivated by an increase in the 
transparency of monetary policy actions. Greater transparency is useful in improving public 
understanding and support for monetary policy and the democratic accountability of the central 
bank. It (communication) can improve the effectiveness of policy by encouraging behavior in wages 
and prices and in the financial system that should help the central bank achieve its objectives of 
stabilizing prices and smoothing economic fluctuations. It can also improve the predictability of 
central bank actions and increase the independence of central banks, so that the central bank will 
provide economic actors with their own view of the fundamental factors that guide monetary 
policy, leading to the creation of a cycle virtuous. Communication boosts credibility, through 
increasing self-discipline and improves medium-term monetary policy expectations (Tomuleasa, 
2015). 
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What to communicate? What specific types of central bank communication are most important? 
It is possible to distinguish at least four broad categories of issues, on which a central bank may 
consider revealing more or less to the public. The first, objectives and strategies; the second, the 
reasons for a particular political decision; the third is the overall economic outlook, the assessment 
of future indicators and economic activity; the fourth, projections and future monetary policy 
decisions (Blinder and al. 2008). This is the information that central banks must provide in terms 
of a good communications strategy. The strategic importance of the content of each of these 
messages comes from the central bank's ability to manipulate the actions of economic agents. This 
type of communication increases the general commitment of the central bank to transparency and 
accountability. In addition, it should be noted that many central banks are actively seeking 
opportunities to become even more open, such as the publication of more articulated statements 
that accompany political decisions and the publication of monitoring reports to provide more 
analytical information. 
However, the difficulties associated with accurately calibrating the amounts and types of 
information to be disclosed on different aspects of the monetary policy making process. Part of 
the difficulty comes from different audiences with different abilities and levels of interest. Thus, in 
addition to the costs of collecting, collating, editing and disseminating information, central banks 
must spend resources to continuously assess and monitor the information needs of different 
audiences, especially as these needs evolve. with time. 
In addition, the main challenges will come from the public's understanding of the objectives of the 
central bank and its interpretation of the economy, current and future (Carpenter, 2004), this will 
require a capacity for population literacy, or that would seem difficult for the public in 
underdeveloped countries to understand the economic stakes and the decisions taken by the central 
bank4. Pinshi (2020), proposes a solution to this situation by suggesting to the central banks, more 
specifically for the case of the BCC, to publish statements and summaries on the development of 
current and future monetary policy in the national language, which is the language easy for the 
general public. This could be done in many developing and underdeveloped countries, especially 
for African economies. 
How to communicate? Central banks also face the challenge of choosing the best means and 
modalities by which information should be transmitted. Indeed, each central bank is confronted 
with the reality of its economy, although having similar objectives, they can use various 
communication tools, which vary from one bank to another. 
The two main ways in which central banks communicate are actions and words (written and 
spoken). Unstable periods were marked by more action than words. However, as the credibility of 
central banks grows, words become more and more important. Indeed, the past two decades have 
shown how words and deeds can reinforce each other to establish the credibility of central banks 
in terms of price stability (Blinder and al., 2008). In addition, post-meeting statements, press 
conferences, notes on projections, reports and other communications are one of the main means 
by which the central bank communicates its actions, its assessment of the economy and its thinking 
on future policy. Messages can be sent by the committee or by an individual member of the 
committee, such as the Governor. 
 
 
4 The underdeveloped countries are characterized by a very low level of literacy among their populations. This can be 
a bias for a good communication strategy. 
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4. Strategy for good communication on depository corporations and the general 
public 
A good communication strategy depends on the presentation of written and spoken words, it is 
crucial for anticipation management by providing meaningful and necessary information, but also 
by reducing the term of errors and preventing misinformation. Central banks have choices of 
instruments such as press conferences, provision of meeting minutes and votes, periodic 
publication of monetary policy reports, choice of spokesperson for political matters, speeches, 
press interviews, publication of models and forecasts, provision of information on the website, use 
of social media and so on. 
Central banks must have clear communication objectives in order to avoid information overload 
that could lead to deterioration of rational decision-making by the general public. While the final 
objective relates to the effective management of expectations (forming adequate anticipations of 
the public in relation to the decisions taken by decision-makers), the intermediate objectives of 
central bank communication should necessarily include transparency, accountability, clarity and 
credibility (Chart 1.). These objectives will enable the general public to gain a better understanding 
of central bank policies and will increase the effectiveness of monetary policy through greater 
confidence in the central bank. Among the intermediate objectives, Naghdaliyev (2011) argues that 
credibility is the most important, noting that the ability of a central bank to properly shape 
expectations depends on its credibility. Thus, the crucial link between central bank communication 
and the credibility of the central bank is one of the reasons why communication has become an 
important aspect of monetary policy. With higher credibility and anchored inflation expectations, 
central banks can not only maintain inflation, but also promote economic growth (Mishkin, 2004). 
On the sidelines, for increased credibility, operational independence should be preserved - that is, 
the freedom for a central bank to conduct and implement monetary policy, which is the case for 
the BCC, which enjoys great operational independence. 
The BCC not only issues a press release with the political decision, but also holds a press conference 
on the day of the Monetary Policy Committee (CPM) meetings, including a question and answer 
session a few times. The press conference avoids the considerable delay in writing the minutes and 
could be televised live or rebroadcast. Another possibility for communication is inherent in its legal 
requirements for annual reports in real time. Among the instruments which should convey the 
most important reporting information are regular publications such as the report on monetary 
policy, which contains both the assessment of economic developments, information on the 
analytical framework used and in annexes we include some follow-up to the meetings of the CPM. 
The dynamism of these communications tools can improve the effectiveness of monetary policy 
and restore the confidence and credibility of the BCC. 
Inflation in the DRC is much more influenced by expectations linked to exchange rate  (Pinshi and 
Sungani, 218) and inflation fluctuations. This is the result of a lack of confidence and / or of the 
agents' ignorance of the monetary authority's responses to stabilization. It is important for the 
public to understand the actions of the central bank to promote the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. For not only are policy expectations important, but also good communication would 
provide the public with information on current and future monetary policy, economic prospects 
and the objectives of the central bank. This would contribute to the formation of agents' 
expectations regarding the conduct of monetary policy in the future and inflation in the coming 
periods. In this sense, communication acts in a useful way, guiding the anticipations of agents and 
playing an important role in decision-making. Thus, monetary policy becomes more predictable 
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and, therefore, communication becomes an important operational and strategic framework for the 
central bank. With confidence restored, agents will no longer have to anticipate a monetary 
depreciation, which in turn would allow inflation to be brought under control. In addition, through 
this communication tool the bank could affect the economy. However, this communication action 
requires real independence from the BCC to anchor credibility in a lasting manner. 
It has been shown that not taking communication into account can lead to bias, which is prejudicial 
to disrupting the responses expected when central banks implement their monetary policy 
(Bennani, 2014). 
 
Chart 1. Central banks Communication objectives   
 
 
 
                                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Naghdaliyev (2011) 
 
Impact on depository corporations. The essence of a useful monetary policy is to manage 
expectations effectively. This applies to both the objectives and the instruments (Al-Mashat and 
al., 2018). The main long-term objective of monetary policy is to create a sustainable environment 
of low inflation, and communication is conducive to the success and achievement of this objective. 
There is a close two-way relationship between central banks and deposit-taking institutions 
(Mishkin, 2010; Soubeyran, 2010). Extensive research has focused on the flow of information from 
central banks to depository corporations and has shown that central bank communication has 
strong effects on the financial system (Blinder and al., 2008). Hence, the deposit-taking institutions 
react strongly to the communication of the central bank's assessment of the current economic 
Central banks Communication objectives   
Transparency Accountability 
Preserve operational 
independence 
Credibility 
Clarity 
Adequate expectations 
Intermediate objectives 
Final objective 
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situation and the economic outlook. At the same time, causality is moving in the other direction. 
Depository corporations send signals to the central bank, which is a central part of decision-
making. 
Impact on the general public. It should be remembered that central banks have a lot to learn 
from the people. Changes in exchange rate and agent inflation expectations should be a monitoring 
indicator for central banks, as they affect people's decision-making and therefore shape economic 
outcomes (Duca and al., 2017). For a better communication strategy, central banks should place 
paramount importance on ensuring that the general public understands the central bank's mandate 
(ultimate objective) and has confidence in its commitment and its ability to fulfill its mandate. 
Understanding the mandate for the general public reduces uncertainty about future price and 
exchange rate developments. In addition, confidence would ensure that expectations of households 
and consumers do not stray too far from the objective set by the BCC. It would therefore be 
important for the BCC to better publicize its mandate to build public confidence in the central 
bank. The task and the challenges of the BCC would be to communicate using several national 
languages. In any case, it is imperative to think about it for an easy anchoring of the general public's 
expectations around the objectives of the BCC. 
In addition, it would be important to develop educational materials on monetary policy (videos, 
questions and answers, short notes on the ABCs, etc.) and have them available on the BCC website, 
as is the case. for the majority of central banks. In addition, we should be more present on social 
networks (Twitter, WhatsApp ...), because it is an important channel through which central banks 
can directly reach a relatively larger audience, without intermediaries, and interact with the public, 
by example via question and answer sessions on Twitter (De Guindos, 2019). 
The BCC should strive to produce and make regular publications (research, policy) more accessible 
to the general public. The BCC’s website should be revitalized and the necessary data made 
available to the public for their analysis and appreciation of the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
 
5. Communication during COVID-19: Strategy to reduce the cost of the crisis 
The coronavirus epidemic has confronted countries with immeasurable macroeconomic upheavals, 
sinking the Congolese economy. The BCC has undertaken some accommodative measures, but it 
does not seem easy to stabilize the economy. In addition, the exchange rate depreciates more, 
correlating with a general rise in prices. This instability is exacerbated by the uncertainty of COVID-
19, which affects expectations of the exchange rate and inflation. As we have mentioned, inflation 
is an increasing function of exchange rate and inflation expectations. This extraordinary pandemic 
circumstance forced us to confine ourselves, severely limiting movements and displacements. 
Communication could play a major role in economic and social resilience (Pogorel and Preta, 2020). 
It is a necessary tool to mitigate the uncertain effects of this crisis by strengthening the confidence 
of the general public and the financial system. One of the factors that worsened the international 
financial crisis of 2008 was the fact that central bank communication was not as effective as desired 
and caused central banks to see that communication was just as important as the content of 
politicians. Communication has thus become more than a simple means of transparency or 
accountability (Naghdaliyev, 2011). President Roosevelt used communication during the Great 
Depression of 1929 to break the vicious circle in which pessimism amplified the crisis. He 
communicated with the public, intervening regularly with the radio station detailing the decisions 
made and explaining each of the chosen directions. This direct communication policy responded 
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to the concerns of the American people regarding the state of the economy and then provided a 
prospective orientation to economic policy, capable of emerging from the depression and restoring 
macroeconomic stability (Barthélemy and Bignon, 2020). 
The importance of central bank communication as an instrument of monetary policy is vital not 
only to make a central bank more transparent, but also and above all to guide expectations 
(Weidmann, 2018). In fact, sometimes communication could become a policy in its own right, 
rather than an instrument of monetary policy, because closer relations with the general public and 
increased transparency should not only be the end goal of communication, but that the time has 
come for central banks to think about institutionalizing communication. The BCC’s forward-
looking directions would mean that the introduction and implementation of political measures to 
combat the crisis should be accompanied by communications. It is clear that a strategic 
communication articulation, focused on coherent messages, can help manage pessimistic 
expectations, maintain confidence, ultimately reduce the cost of the crisis and stabilize the 
economy. 
 The adoption of a new communication instrument, coordinating policy actions and aimed at 
reaching the whole country in terms of the dedication of monetary policy makers to stabilize the 
economy, in particular, money and prices. In addition, CPM reports should not only be in French 
but also in national languages, namely Lingala, Kikongo, Swahili and Tshiluba. With that, the 
Governor's speeches about monetary policy decisions would capture a large part of the population. 
Especially since operators and economic players have a good command of these languages and 
especially Lingala and Swahili, it would make it easier for the central bank to manage expectations. 
What can the BCC do during this time of uncertainty for the coronavirus? It should deploy written 
and televised speeches and statements to explain to the public its dedication and its ability to 
smooth down depreciation and curb inflation. This serial frequency of communications would 
influence agents' expectations and could boost confidence. The latter in turn would provide 
stability. The communication tool is strategic in this time of crisis and uncertainty. Its purpose is 
to germinate the confidence of agents in political decisions in stabilization and to break the 
pessimism of the general public. However, as mentioned above, for this approach to be effective 
and guarantee its accountability, the real independence of the central bank would have to be 
respected. 
 
6. Conclusion and recommendations 
This paper reveals the close link between communication and monetary policy, and especially in 
exceptional circumstances, such as the crisis linked to the current uncertainty of COVID-19. The 
communication policy of central banks is a crucial aspect of the decision-making and 
implementation process. The communication strategy tends towards a metamorphosis process, 
which can be justified by the fact that a greater opening of monetary authorities to the general 
public, could lead to a strengthening of the management of expectations and the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. 
The BCC has not yet implemented an adoption of new communication practices, however during 
this health and economic crisis, and especially since the conventional tactics of its monetary policy 
have had no effect on stability, a new Monetary policy communication strategy should take on 
additional importance to mitigate other detrimental effects on macroeconomic and monetary 
stability. 
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To reorient and develop a communication strategy, this paper recommends the following 12 
recommendations : 
1. Create a communication department or service within the bank; 
2. Conduct a survey on BCC communication and public opinion in the DRC to improve the 
communication strategy and have enough data on the expectations of the general public; 
3. Build a database containing all of the Governor's speeches and declarations, as well as press 
conferences; 
4. Use media and social networks, such as Twitter, to monitor the economy and forecast more 
accurately; 
5. Expand the use of languages for the public, with Lingala and other national languages. The 
transmission of information in easy Lingala and / or other languages would be beneficial for more 
effective communication, reaching the general public; 
6. Develop a Mailing and e-mailing system to strengthen communication; 
7. Rebuild the website with an adaptation or imitation of the major international central banks; 
8. Recruit more researchers dealing with issues of monetary policy and the financial system and 
create the Central Bank Research Prize to reward research in economics and the financial system 
carried out within the organization; 
9. Availability of the databases (in long series) on the bank's website in Excel and / or pdf format; 
10. Reduce the delay in the publication of the Annual Report and make the report on monetary 
policy more available; 
11. Consider, if necessary, a contract with a television channel for the dissemination of decisions 
and declarations related to monetary policy aimed at stabilizing the economy; 
12. Strengthen scientific publications and articles, and cover delays related to the publication of 
annual reports and monetary policy, strengthen scientific publications and articles, make available 
various statistical databases on the site. 
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